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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the regional and global growth effects of current account imbalances in 
Japan, Germany, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—the three largest persistent 
surplus countries—and the United States and United Kingdom, the two largest persistent 
deficit countries. Controlling for a set of macroeconomic determinants, we use a structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) framework to show that positive shocks to current account 
balances in the PRC, Germany, and Japan transmit positive regional and global growth effects, 
particularly in the case of spillovers to regional growth from Japan. As expected, the global 
growth response is lower in magnitude than the regional growth response. In addition, the 
extent of the effect is amplified by global value chains, pointing to the significant role played 
by trade in intermediate goods. For current account deficit countries, the magnitudes of the 
responses of growth to shocks are much lower on average than in the case of current account 
surplus countries. We find some marginal positive effects on regional and global growth 
emanating from a positive shock on the UK current account—i.e., a reduction in the deficit. 
For the US, a positive shock to its persistent current account deficit marginally drags on global 
growth, possibly reflecting declining import demand and wealth effects linked to  
the US dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. Our findings have important policy 
implications at the global level, particularly in light of the re-emergence of discussions on 
global imbalances in recent years. 
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“A high surplus does not necessarily mean that there is an imbalance. We do need to 
examine this further and understand whether a high surplus in Germany is something 
affecting the functioning of the European economy as a whole” (European Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso, 13 November 2013). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Current account surpluses have persisted in a number of European and Asian 
economies throughout the global financial crisis and thereafter. Along with Germany, 
Japan has a decades-long history of recording current account surpluses. Due to  
rapid improvements in its manufacturing sector competitiveness, Japan has almost 
continuously recorded trade surpluses since the mid-1960s, and as a result, record 
current account surpluses (Shirakawa 2011).1 Japan faced harsh pressure from the US 
on its current account surplus in the 1980s. Germany’s story is similar to that of Japan. 
To allow for macroeconomic rebalancing, both Japan and Germany agreed to let  
their currencies appreciate against the US dollar as part of the Plaza Agreement in 1984. 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to build up large current account surpluses 
after joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, recording a stunning current account 
surplus of 9.9% of GDP in 2007. Although the PRC’s surplus has declined substantially 
since then, the PRC continues to face enormous pressure from the US, not unlike the 
pressure exerted on Japan in the 1980s (Ito 2009). Under the Trump administration, the 
US government has substantially increased pressure on all three surplus countries. 
The question remains whether such imbalances require corrective policy action or 
whether they can be viewed as being a logical outcome of the economic environment. It 
has been suggested that excessive current account surpluses have hampered growth in 
deficit countries. The Economist (2017) even identified a “German problem” and asserted 
that the German current account surplus is “damaging the world economy”. The literature 
to date has tended to focus on the internal adjustments necessary within countries to 
address current account imbalances, rather than assessing their impact at the regional 
and global levels.  
Against this backdrop, this paper addresses the issue of whether current account 
imbalances are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for regional and global growth. In doing so, we also assess 
whether imbalances can be considered to be justified, given macroeconomic 
fundamentals.2 In particular, this paper assesses current account imbalances in the 
three largest persistent current account surplus economies (Germany, Japan, and the 
PRC) and the two largest persistent deficit countries (the US and the UK) in two stages. 
In the first stage, we empirically assess the drivers of the current account positions using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), both in a panel and country-specific  
set-up, over the period 1999 to 2018. In particular, we examine the effect of a range of 
country-specific factors, including standard macroeconomic variables along with the role 
of intermediate trade and value chains (Brumm et al. 2019), the exchange rate 
(Herrmann and Jochem 2013), and the size of the financial sector (Ito and Volz 2013). 
 
1  Japan experienced only brief periods with current account deficits—i.e., 1973–1975 and 1979–1980—
related to increases in the price of oil imports. For analyses of the drivers of Japan’s current account see, 
for instance, Ueda (1988), Ito (1994), Obstfeld (2006), and Horioka (2016). 
2  This is closely related to the external balance concept, defined by Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2014: 
535) as “when a country’s current account is neither so deeply in deficit that the country may be unable 
to repay its foreign debts in the future nor so strongly in surplus that foreigners are put in that position”. 
While the emphasis is on the problems faced by current account deficit countries, the implication is that 
current account surplus countries are at the root of this, transmitting problems for deficit countries to repay 
debts. 
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Building on this, in the second stage, we use impulse response analysis from panel and 
country-specific SVAR models to estimate the reaction of regional and global growth to 
shocks imposed on the current account balances. 
To our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first extensive empirical analysis of  
the effects of current account imbalances on extra-country growth. Overall, we find  
that current account determinants have been largely in line with macroeconomic 
fundamentals over time. In addition, we find that regional economic growth reacts 
positively to a current account balance shock in Germany and Japan, with a notably 
higher magnitude for the latter. Global economic growth also reacts positively to  
a current account balance shock in the PRC, Japan, and Germany. We also find 
evidence that global value chains (GVCs) appear to be important factors affecting 
regional and global growth that accentuate the magnitudes of shocks imposed on current 
account balances. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses 
theoretical considerations and reviews the related literature. Section 3 lays out our 
empirical methodology and the data that we use. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
AND RELATED LITERATURE 
There are a number of within-country structural factors that can determine whether a 
surplus or deficit exists, and while these are controlled for in our empirical analysis, the 
main focus of this paper is on the extra-country growth effects.3 Where a deficit reflects 
higher investment rather than lower savings, this can be beneficial for the growth of the 
respective economy in the long run. On the other hand, a deficit characterized by net 
imports may be indicative of competitiveness concerns. Turning to surplus countries, 
while a current account surplus helps to strengthen the exchange rate and reduce 
dependency on external finance, demographic factors underpinning a surplus and falling 
levels of investment can be negative for domestic long-run growth. 
Early work by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) made the point that the Feldstein Horioka 
puzzle did not hold for the euro area in the period after creation of the European Monetary 
and Economic Union, reflecting rising financial integration—i.e., diverging current 
account balances enabled catch-up for the peripheral countries. On the other hand, the 
large current account surplus in Germany has been attributed by some commentators 
(e.g., Krugman 2013; Pettis 2013; Skidelsky 2014; The Economist 2017) as at least 
partly exacerbating the euro area sovereign debt crisis. It has also been suggested that 
excessive current account surpluses, especially in Germany and the PRC, have 
hampered growth in deficit countries. 
There are several transmission channels through which large current account 
imbalances could affect regional and global growth. A first channel relates to potential 
effects on global interest rates via savings and investment. By definition, a current 
account surplus implies that domestic savings exceed domestic investment, which  
are then exported to the rest of the world. Large-scale savings and resulting capital 
exports could contribute to a global ‘savings glut’ that drives down global interest rates 
(Bernanke 2005). This could have positive impacts on global growth, as low interest rates 
facilitate investment. However, (too) low interest rates could also fuel overinvestment 
 
3  For an overview of structural factors driving current account imbalances, see, for instance, Cheung, 
Furceri, and Rusticelli (2013) and Kollmann et al. (2015). 
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and spark unsustainable growth booms. Low interest rates could also contribute to 
financing unsustainable consumption booms. Last but not least, low interest rates could 
contribute to asset price inflation and lay the groundwork for a later financial crisis. All of 
these effects were observable in the eurozone periphery in the run-up to the euro crisis.  
A current account surplus leading to sizeable capital outflows could also have detrimental 
financial stability effects related to enhanced international capital flows.  
It should be noted, however, that, historically, so-called capital flow bonanzas to 
emerging economies were often driven by capital outflows from large deficit countries, 
most notably the US (Reinhart and Reinhart 2009). Sizable capital outflows can also 
contribute to the relative competitiveness of economies due to exchange rate valuation 
effects. Indeed, competitiveness spillover effects have often led to complaints about 
alleged currency manipulation by surplus countries. 
Other channels through which current account imbalances may impact abroad are 
related to the effects on global demand/consumption and employment (and prices and 
wages). Arguing from a Keynesian perspective, Krugman (2013) asserts that “in a world 
ruled by inadequate demand … [b]y running inappropriate large surpluses, Germany is 
hurting growth and employment in the world at large.” The complaint directed at Germany 
(and the PRC) is that wage restraint has depressed domestic consumption, which has 
also reduced demand for foreign imports (and hence growth abroad). With domestic 
investment lower than domestic savings, Germany has allegedly forced its savings 
surpluses onto its trading partners (Pettis 2013). Moreover, German wage restraint and 
low inflation are argued to have depressed wage growth among its trade partners, 
especially those in the eurozone that could no longer devalue their own currency (Horn 
et al. 2017). 
However, the demand argument can also be turned on its head. To the extent that large 
export surpluses support growth in the surplus countries, this could, in turn, stimulate 
imports by these countries from the rest of the world. In this context, it is important to 
highlight the growing role of trade in intermediate goods (Baldwin 2013). Through the 
import of intermediate goods, large current account surplus countries like the PRC and 
Germany could support investment and production in those countries producing or 
processing intermediate goods in earlier stages of the supply chain. These will often be 
economies in the same region. 
There has been surprisingly little empirical analysis of these potential spillover effects of 
large current account imbalances. International organizations, including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (2015) and the European Commission (2015), have frequently 
argued that a demand expansion in Germany would have positive effects  
on demand in other eurozone countries.4 Recently, using an input-output model, Picek 
and Schroder (2018) have estimated the spillover effects size of an expansion  
of Germany’s final demand on GDP, employment, and the trade balance in deficit 
countries in Southern Europe. Although the magnitudes of the spillover effects that they 
find are larger than those of the above-mentioned studies by the IMF (2015) and  
the European Commission (2015) based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models, they still conclude that “a modest expansion in Germany alone will hardly make 
a significant contribution to the external adjustment process in the south” (Picek and 
Schroder 2018: 2218). However, while insightful, these studies model the effects of a 
demand expansion in Germany, not changes to Germany’s current account as such.  
Our aim in this paper is to make a first attempt to identify whether current account 
imbalances transmit abroad, while controlling for a range of macroeconomic 
 
4  See also Elekdag and Muir (2014) and In’t Veld (2017). 
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fundamentals. As such, it is not our intention to test each of the transmission channels 
described, but rather, as a first attempt at filling the gap in the literature, to test empirically 
whether extra-country growth effects are found.  
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
To comprehensively examine how current account imbalances affect regional and global 
growth, we employ a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we empirically assess the 
drivers of the current account positions to check whether imbalances can be considered 
to be justified given macroeconomic fundamentals. We control for within-country 
structural factors that can determine whether a surplus or deficit exists. In the second 
stage, using impulse response analysis from a structural VAR, we examine the reaction 
of regional and global growth to shocks imposed on the current account balances of our 
countries of interest. These analyses are described in more detail in the following 
subsections. 
3.1 First Stage: The Determinants of the Current Account 
In order to assess the drivers of current account imbalances, we initially estimate the 
following reduced-form equation: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 refers to the current account balance to GDP ratio for country 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is a vector of macroeconomic fundamental variables, which includes real GDP 
growth, the fiscal balance as a share of GDP, trade openness as a share of GDP, net 
foreign assets relative to GDP, the credit to GDP ratio, the real effective exchange rate, 
integration into GVCs, and the old-age dependency ratio. These variables are lagged by 
one period to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 denote the country-specific and 
time fixed effects, while εi,t is the disturbance term. 
We use the following data to estimate Eq. (1). The left-hand side variable, the current 
account balance to GDP ratio, is obtained from the Quarterly National Accounts of OECD 
Statistics. For our macroeconomic fundamental variables on the right-hand side, we 
obtain the credit to GDP ratio and the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate from 
the Statistics of the Bank for International Settlements. Real GDP growth is obtained 
from the Quarterly National Accounts of OECD Statistics and the China Economic 
Database (CEIC) database.5 Trade openness is measured by the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP, which is also obtained from the Quarterly National Accounts 
of OECD Statistics and the CEIC database. The fiscal balance as a share of GDP, 
defined as the cyclically adjusted primary balance to GDP ratio, is obtained from IMF 
Fiscal Monitor Statistics. Likewise, net foreign assets relative to GDP are obtained from 
IMF International Financial Statistics. The old-age dependency ratio, defined as the ratio 
of people older than 64 to the working-age population, is obtained from the World Bank 
database. Finally, using the UNCTAD-Eora Global Value Chain Database, we define 
GVCs as foreign value added plus domestic value added as a percentage of the rest of 
 
5  The CEIC database provides quarterly national accounts statistics for the PRC that include real GDP, 
exports, and imports, which are not available in OECD Statistics. 
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the world.6 All data mentioned above are obtained at quarterly frequency, covering the 
period from 1999Q1 to 2018Q4.7 
We estimate Eq. (1) by OLS with country-time fixed effects. Overall, for our specification, 
we obtain a panel of 400 observations for five countries over the period from 1999Q1 to 
2018Q4. 
Since the panel analysis may still omit within-country structural factors that can 
determine whether a surplus or deficit exists even if country-time fixed effects are 
controlled, we further estimate the country-specific model as follows:8 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  (2) 
where CAt denotes the current account balance to GDP ratio at time t, Xt-1 is a lagged 
vector of macroeconomic fundamentals as per equation (1), 𝛼𝛼 refers to the intercept, and 
εt is the disturbance term. 
This is an important first stage in the analysis, as the variables used in this basic 
framework will inform the structural VAR set-up on identifying how regional and global 
growth respond to shocks imposed on domestic current account balances. 
3.2 Second Stage: Impulse Responses from Panel  
and Country-Specific Structural VARs 
To examine how current account imbalances affect regional and global growth, 
incorporating the estimation results from the previous section, we conduct our second-
stage analysis based on a number of SVAR models: a panel SVAR across the five 
countries, as well as impulse responses generated from country-specific SVARs. In the 
SVAR model, as well as the selected right-hand side variables used in the first-stage 
estimation, we include global GDP growth (%) and regional GDP growth (%). An 
important innovation in our approach is that the estimated impulse responses control for 
a large number of macroeconomic determinants. 
The global growth rate is calculated using the quarterly world (real) GDP series from the 
World Bank Global Economic Monitor database. The definition of regional growth is 
different for each country. For the PRC, the regional growth rate refers to the quarterly 
real GDP growth rate of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries plus Japan and the Republic of Korea and excluding the PRC, obtained from 
Haver Analytics. For Japan, the regional growth rate refers to the quarterly real GDP 
growth rate of the ASEAN countries plus the PRC and the Republic of Korea and 
excluding Japan, obtained from Haver Analytics and the CEIC. For Germany, the 
regional growth rate refers to the quarterly real GDP growth rate of the euro area 
excluding Germany, obtained from the Quarterly National Accounts of OECD Statistics. 
For the United Kingdom, the regional growth rate refers to the quarterly real GDP growth 
rate of the European Union excluding the UK, also obtained from the Quarterly National 
Accounts of OECD Statistics. For the United States, the regional growth rate refers to 
the quarterly real GDP growth rate of the United States’ top seven trading partners 
 
6  Previous works such as Brumm et al. (2019) use the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) to measure 
GVCs. However, WIOD only covers time series up to 2014, while the UNCTAD-Eora Global Value Chain 
Database covers a longer time period, from 1990 to 2018. 
7  The quarterly data on fiscal balance, net foreign assets, old-age dependency, and GVCs are interpolated 
from the annual time series using the quadratic spine interpolation method. 
8  We use the same dataset explained above to estimate Eq. (2) for each country. The estimation is based 
on the OLS method. 
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including the PRC, Mexico, Japan, Canada, Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the 
United Kingdom, obtained from Haver Analytics. All the mentioned variables have the 
same time span as those in the first stage. 
The panel SVAR can be denoted as follows in its general specification, with structural 
shocks identified by a recursive restriction: 
𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)Δ𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3) 
where A(L) is the matrix of lag polynomial, Yi,t refers to the demeaned value of Xt of the 
country i to accommodate country-specific fixed effects, and εi,t is a vector of structural 
disturbances. Following the setting of the previous SVAR model, we take a first-
difference form of Yi,t as ΔYi,t. The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive form 
is the same as in the previous SVAR model. The panel VAR includes two lags selected 
by the Akaike information criterion. 
A similar general set-up applies to the country-specific SVARs, which are specified  
as follows: 
𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)Δ𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  (4) 
where 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator 𝐿𝐿; Δ𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 refers to a vector of our 
selected endogenous variables in the first-difference form that consist of global growth, 
regional growth, current account balance, and macroeconomic fundamentals; and 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is 
a vector of structural disturbances. The identification strategy used is based on a block 
recursive restriction (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999), which results in the 
following matrix 𝐴𝐴 to fit a just-identified model: 
𝐴𝐴 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑎𝑎1,1 0 … 0
𝑎𝑎2,1 ⋱ ⋱ ⋮
⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0
𝑎𝑎11,1 … 𝑎𝑎11,10 𝑎𝑎11,11⎦⎥⎥
⎤
   (5) 
The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive form implies that the variables  
at the top (such as 𝑎𝑎1,1 ) will not be affected by contemporaneous shocks to the  
lower variables (such as 𝑎𝑎2,1,𝑎𝑎11,1, . .. ), while the lower variables will be affected by 
contemporaneous shocks to the upper variables. Usually, slower-moving variables are 
better candidates to be ordered before fast-moving variables (Bruno and Shin 2015). It 
therefore follows that we place the global growth variable at the top in the ordering, which 
implies that the global growth rate will only be affected by a contemporaneous shock to 
itself. Following the global growth variable, we place the regional growth variable second 
in the ordering, which implies that the regional growth rate will be affected by 
contemporaneous shock to the global growth and itself, but not by contemporaneous 
shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals or current account balance. Importantly, we put 
the current account balance in last place in the ordering, which is based not only on the 
assumption that global growth and regional growth will affect the state of the current 
account, but also on consideration of our first-stage empirical results that imply the 
macroeconomic fundamentals that drive the current account imbalance. Lastly, we place 
our macroeconomic fundamentals in the middle of the ordering. The lag selection of the 
SVAR model is based on the Akaike information criterion, which suggests that our model 
should be with two lags. While the main  
focus is on the results from the country-specific models, we also set up the VAR in panel 
form.  
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For robustness, we also use a sign restriction approach to identify the shocks. 
Essentially, the idea is to keep the variables of interest, regional and global growth, 
unrestricted, while imposing specific sign restrictions on the rest of the variables. We 
suggest that a positive current account balance shock will not decrease current account 
balances for certain periods. For our macro-fundamental variables, the sign restrictions 
are imposed following Brumm et al. (2019). All sign restrictions are binding for four 
periods (quarters) after the current account balance shock. Table A1 in the Appendix 
summarizes the restrictions imposed. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results from the regression analysis on determinants is a crucial first stage, as this 
underpins the second stage analysis as regards controlling for macroeconomic 
determinants in the impulse responses. The first column in Table 1 reports the estimation 
result of the panel analysis based on Eq. (1). From the second column to the sixth column 
in Table 1, the estimation results of the country-specific analysis based on Eq. (2) are 
reported. Importantly, while there is some cross-country heterogeneity in terms of the 
magnitude of the coefficients, our results are largely statistically significant across 
countries and across variables. To further test if our first-stage model successfully 
assesses the drivers of current account imbalances, we compare the fitted values of the 
first-stage model estimated in Eq. (2) with the actual current account balances, which 
are illustrated in Figures A1 to A5. The figures show that our first-stage model is well 
fitted for all five countries, providing a strong basis for the next-stage analysis. 
Table 1: The Determinants of the Current Account Balance  
(% GDP) 
LHS: Current Account 
Balance (in % of GDP) 
Panel 
Analysis 
(1) 
PRC 
(2) 
Germany 
(3) 
Japan 
(4) 
United 
Kingdom 
(5) 
United 
States 
(6) 
Real GDP Growth (%) 0.249*** 
(0.077) 
0.251 
(0.163) 
0.210 
(0.144) 
0.411*** 
(0.095) 
0.313 
(0.197) 
–0.671*** 
(0.122) 
Credit to GDP (% of GDP) –0.023*** 
(0.006) 
–0.089*** 
(0.023) 
0.058 
(0.036) 
–0.111*** 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
–0.032* 
(0.017) 
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.130*** 
(0.022) 
0.204*** 
(0.048) 
0.025 
(0.044) 
–0.168*** 
(0.050) 
–0.045 
(0.061) 
–0.254*** 
(0.062) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(log) 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.092 
(0.055) 
0.099* 
(0.053) 
–0.002 
(0.016) 
–0.069*** 
(0.023) 
–0.156*** 
(0.022) 
Net Foreign Assets (% of 
GDP) 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
0.042 
(0.048) 
0.134*** 
(0.037) 
–0.116** 
(0.048) 
0.084 
(0.102) 
0.064 
(0.082) 
Old-Age Dependency (%) –0.041 
(0.027) 
–0.815 
(0.394) 
–0.324 
(0.128) 
–0.122** 
(0.048) 
–0.600** 
(0.250) 
0.881*** 
(0.102) 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) –0.073 
(0.055) 
–0.815*** 
(0.394) 
–0.099 
(0.128) 
0.498*** 
(0.094) 
0.215 
(0.137) 
–0.111** 
(0.054) 
Global Value Chain (% of Rest 
of World) 
–0.162 
(0.109) 
0.475 
(0.793) 
–1.442*** 
(0.419) 
–0.986** 
(0.445) 
1.695* 
(0.934) 
0.527** 
(0.230) 
Constant  –48.848* 
(26.589) 
–44.773* 
(24.562) 
40.591*** 
(9.094) 
34.531* 
(17.571) 
59.214*** 
(10.893) 
Time and Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Observations 400 80 80 80 80 80 
𝑅𝑅2 0.557 0.744 0.913 0.604 0.543 0.822 
***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level. The coefficients refer to the 
estimation of equation (1) for the panel and equation (2) for the country-specific models. 
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: Panel 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the (95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the (95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive restriction. 
In line with previous findings in the literature, we find that credit/GDP, trade openness, 
net foreign assets/GDP, the fiscal balance, and old-age dependency are important 
factors explaining current account positions. Credit/GDP is negatively and significantly 
associated with current account balances, and this can be related to capital inflows 
fueling credit growth. We also find a significant role played by GVCs. Brumm et al. (2019) 
make the point that the IMF’s External Balance Assessment model generally performs 
poorly in explaining the current account for countries with large imbalances. Our results 
indicate that GVCs are important driving factors of the current account in four of the top 
five largest countries with current account imbalances. Figures A1 to A5 indicate that, for 
all of the countries, our regression models suggest that the current account balances 
appear to be largely justified by fundamentals—i.e., the actual current account balances 
track very closely the fitted values from the estimation of  
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Eq. 2. Given the recent literature on the important role played by GVCs, we explore this 
further in the SVAR analysis, firstly with the panel and then the country-specific models. 
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: PRC 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the (95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive restriction. 
Our panel SVAR impulse responses, as shown in Figure 1, indicate a positive reaction 
by regional and global growth to positive shocks to the current account balance  
(i.e., increasing a current account surplus or reducing a current account deficit). The 
magnitude of the effect is stronger on regional growth than global growth by a factor of 
around ten, with a one percentage point rise in the current account balance increasing 
regional growth by around 0.2 percentage points. Where GVCs are incorporated into the 
VAR, the response of regional and global growth remains positive and significant over 
ADBI Working Paper 1094 Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 
 
10 
 
time. In order to delve deeper into the issue, we also compute impulse responses based 
on country-specific SVARs.9 
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: Japan 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to  
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error 
bands of the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard 
error bands of the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive 
restriction. 
 
  
 
9  In addition, for robustness, we have used sign restrictions to identify the shocks in the SVAR, and these 
results are consistent with those based on block recursive identification. The shocks based on sign 
restrictions are provided in the Appendix in Figures A6 to A10. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: Germany 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive restriction.  
Turning to the impulse responses from our country-specific SVAR models, the results 
suggest that regional growth reacts strongly and positively to one-unit shocks imposed 
on the Chinese, Japanese, and German current account balances (see Figures 2 to 4 
respectively). Global growth also reacts positively, albeit with the expected lower 
magnitudes. The responses of regional and global growth, which peak after around six 
quarters, are notably stronger when GVCs are incorporated into the VAR. The results 
are particularly strong in terms of the magnitude of regional growth spillovers from 
positive shocks to the Japanese current account balance. This may be related to Japan’s 
dominant position globally in relation to the size of its net foreign assets,  
with Japan investing heavily abroad and particularly in Asia. While a large current 
account surplus is indicative of a strong and competitive export sector and weaker 
domestic demand and investment, the expectation may prima facie be that this should 
detrimentally affect growth abroad. However, our findings are very much in line with 
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expectations from international macroeconomic theory, whereby a current account 
surplus implies an excess of national savings over investment and net capital outflows 
invested abroad. The productive use of such investment has clear positive implications 
for growth abroad. We also find that the magnitude of the effect on growth is amplified 
by trade in intermediate goods. This suggests that growing exports from current account 
surplus countries enhance the demand for imports in intermediate goods that are 
required as inputs for export production. Indeed, some work has supported the view that 
Germany acts as a regional hub for growth via GVCs (e.g., Baldwin 2013).  
Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock:  
United Kingdom 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to  
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error 
bands of the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard 
error bands of the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive 
restriction.  
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: United States 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on block recursive restriction.  
Turning to the current account deficit countries, a positive shock to the current account 
balance (i.e., reducing the deficit) results in different outcomes for the UK and the US. 
For the UK, as shown in Figure 5, we find that a one percentage point reduction in its 
current account deficit has a similar positive effect on regional and global growth of 
around 0.1 percentage points. This result is consistent with those found for shocks on 
current account surplus countries, albeit with smaller average magnitudes. A shift in the 
current account deficit toward more balance implies a reduction in net capital inflows to 
the UK from abroad and rising net exports, the resulting boost to domestic growth having 
positive spillovers abroad. 
 
For the US, however, we find that a reduction in its current account deficit drags on 
regional and global growth, although there is a positive effect on regional growth after 
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around eight quarters (see Figure 6). Shocks imposed on the US current account 
balance therefore clearly lead to different effects on growth than for the other countries, 
possibly related to the global reserve currency status of the US dollar and transmission 
of the negative domestic effects of the US deficit abroad. High demand for US Treasury 
bonds from abroad even at very low interest rates (so-called ‘exorbitant privilege’) and 
the scale of US dollar-denominated claims held abroad are key distinguishing factors for 
the US. Our results indicate that a one percentage point shift in the US current account 
balance from deficit toward surplus would drag on global growth by around  
0.3 percentage points. One explanation is that less demand from the US for goods and 
services from the rest of the world would have negative growth effects abroad. 
Historically, US consumers have acted as the ‘buyer of last resort’ for the global 
economy, propping up global demand (Greider 1998). Lower US import demand could 
hurt growth elsewhere. A further explanation is that a decline in the US current account 
deficit (which, through corresponding changes to the capital account, would lower 
demand for US dollar-denominated financial assets) would lead to a depreciation in the 
US dollar, which would lead to a negative wealth effect on foreign investors, reducing the 
value of already existing US dollar-denominated claims. Moreover, it is well understood 
that the US dollar’s reserve currency status means that it can finance its borrowing from 
abroad at a relatively low cost, and this helps to spur domestic and global growth. It 
follows that a reduction in the US deficit may have a detrimental effect on global growth. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the regional and global growth effects of the current account 
balances of the PRC, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. Controlling for a host of 
macroeconomic determinants, we find that current account surplus shocks emanating 
from the PRC, Japan, and Germany have strong positive effects on regional growth. 
Global growth also reacts positively to current account shocks in these economies, albeit 
with somewhat lower magnitudes. These positive effects hold regardless of whether 
GVCs are accounted for, although the responses are notably stronger with GVCs. For 
current account deficit countries, the magnitude of the effect of positive shocks to the 
current account balance (i.e., reducing the deficit) on regional and global growth is much 
lower. For the UK, its resulting stronger net exports spill over positively abroad, helped 
by trade in intermediate goods. In the case of the US, there is a slight negative effect on 
global growth as the effects of its deficit transmit negatively abroad. Arguably, this is 
related to the US dollar’s special status as a global reserve currency and the scale of 
US-dollar denominated assets abroad. In particular, a positive shock to the US current 
account balance and resulting depreciation of the US dollar could have negative wealth 
effects abroad, as the value of US-dollar denominated claims held by foreign investors 
would fall.  
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Our findings have important policy implications. In particular, they suggest that countries 
with large and persistent current account surpluses do not necessarily drag on regional 
growth, contrary to conventional wisdom that their inherent lower levels of domestic 
demand and investment and highly competitive export sector negatively affect the growth 
of the region. Therefore, rather than focus on measures aimed  
at reducing high and persistent current account surpluses per se, it is important for 
policymakers to understand more closely the nature of trade between countries, notably 
in relation to trade in intermediate goods at the regional level. Going forward, future 
research may consider examining the channels through which different characterizations 
of a current account imbalance affect extra-country growth at the regional and global 
levels. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Sign Restrictions 
 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Global 
Growth 
Regional 
Growth 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Credit 
to 
GDP 
Trade 
Openness REER 
Net 
Foreign 
Assets 
Old-Age 
Dependency 
Fiscal 
Balance 
Global 
Value 
Chain 
Positive 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Shock 
>0 ? ? <0 <0 >0 <0 <0 <0 <0 >0 
Note: ? denotes no restriction; > defines a positive effect of the current account balance shock on the variable; < defines 
a negative effect of the current account balance shock on the variable 
Figure A1: Current Account Balance and Fitted Values from the First-Stage 
Regression: PRC 
 
Figure A2: Current Account Balance and Fitted Values from the First-Stage 
Regression: Germany 
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Figure A3: Current Account Balance and Fitted Values from the First-Stage 
Regression: Japan 
 
Figure A4: Current Account Balance and Fitted Values from the First-Stage 
Regression: United Kingdom 
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Figure A5: Current Account Balance and Fitted Values from the First-Stage 
Regression: United States 
 
Figure A6: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: PRC 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on sign restrictions as per Table 
A1.  
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Figure A7: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: Japan 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on sign restrictions as per Table 
A1.  
Figure A8: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock: Germany 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on sign restrictions as per Table 
A1.  
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Figure A9: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock:  
United Kingdom 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on sign restrictions as per Table 
A1.  
Figure A10: Impulse Responses to Current Account Balance Shock:  
United States 
 
Note: The blue line refers to the impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red line refers to the impulse 
response in the framework that excludes GVCs. The blue shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of the 
impulse response in the framework that includes GVCs. The red shaded area refers to the 95%) standard error bands of 
the impulse response in the framework that excludes GVCs. Identification scheme based on sign restrictions as per Table 
A1. 
 
